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FREE SPEECH MATTERS: THE ROBERTS COURT AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Joel M. Gora
This Symposium would not have happened without the support and
guidance of Dean Nicholas Allard and Judge Andrew Napolitano,
and without the participation of so many First Amendment experts
and scholars, many of whom have been long-time professional and
personal friends, and all of whom have contributed greatly to the
consideration of these critical issues by presenting views across the
spectrum about the proper measure of free speech.
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INTRODUCTION
At a time when we have had, in my view, the most free speechprotective Supreme Court in memory, this is, nonetheless, a perilous
time for speech. For a ten-year period, the Roberts Supreme Court
may well have been the most speech-protective Court in a
generation, if not in our history, extending free speech protection on
a number of fronts and rebuffing claims by government and its allies
to limit such protections.1 Yet these free speech rulings have drawn
fire from critics, both on and off the Court, contending that the
1

See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012)
(concluding that Alvarez lying about having military honors is protected free
speech); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (finding the
sale and rental of violent video games to minors is protected free speech); Snyder
v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011) (holding offensive speech targeted at the
family of a deceased soldier on the day of his funeral is speech protected by the
First Amendment ); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) (finding
the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that reveal the prescribing
practices of individual doctors to be a form of protected speech); United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (holding the commercial creation, sale, or
possession of depictions of animal cruelty to be protected by the First
Amendment); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372
(2010) (finding independent corporate expenditures for electioneering
communications to be protected by the First Amendment).

FREE SPEECH MATTERS

65

decisions are inconsistent with the democratic and egalitarian
purposes of the First Amendment and that they overprotect free
speech at the expense of competing and important values, such as
equality, privacy, decency, or democracy.2 And in the trenches of
everyday life, censorship and suppression of speech seem more the
rule than the exception, both at home and abroad. Free speech is thus
at a crucial constitutional and cultural crossroad.
The Roberts Court celebrated its tenth anniversary on January
30, 2016, a decade after Associate Justice Samuel Alito joined the
Court, which Chief Justice John G. Roberts had been appointed to
lead a few months earlier.3 The resulting coalition of a five Justice
“conservative majority” has had a significant impact on the Court’s
jurisprudence in a number of areas, and this has been especially
evident in its rulings on the crucial First Amendment right of
freedom of speech, reaffirming and expanding powerful protection
for free speech in a variety of settings. In the process, the Court has
rebuffed numerous attempts by government and its allies to restrict
established free speech protections or create new free speech
limitations. The Court created a sort of free speech “Camelot,” with
powerful, perhaps unprecedented, application of free speech
principles and protection of free speech values. If one were to ask,
2

See, e.g., Citizens United, 310 U.S. at 393, 446, 478–80 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (proclaiming the majority’s “conclusion that the societal interest in
avoiding corruption and the appearance of corruption does not provide an
adequate justification for regulating corporate expenditures on candidate elections
relies on an incorrect description of that interest, along with a failure to
acknowledge the relevance of established facts and the considered judgments of
state and federal legislatures over many decades”); Snyder, 562 U.S. at 463–65
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“Our profound national commitment to free and open
debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.”);
Brown, 564 U.S. at 847–48 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (communicating the idea that
California’s law restricting the sale or rental of violent video games to minors
only imposes a “modest restriction on expression” while furthering a compelling
state interest in the least restrictive means possible and should therefore be
upheld). See also sources cited infra, note 27 (showing academic critics of the
Roberts Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence).
3
An earlier version of the themes in this Introduction appeared in my blog
entry: Joel Gora, The Roberts Court & the Future of Free Speech, CONCURRING
OPINIONS (Oct. 5, 2015), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2015/10/joelgora-the-roberts-court-the-future-of-free-speech.html.
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paraphrasing Ronald Reagan, “Is free speech better off now than it
was 10 years ago,” I think the clear answer would be “yes.”4
First, in a series of cases, the most well-known of which is
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,5 the Court has
insisted that protecting political speech is at the heart of the First
Amendment’s purposes in American democracy and that limits on
political spending are limits on political speech and can rarely be
justified. The Court’s theory, echoing earlier rulings, has been that
government restrictions on how much can be spent to speak about
politics and government, and what individuals or groups can do the
spending and speaking, are fundamentally anathema to the essence
of political freedom of speech and association.6
In these campaign finance cases, the Court has also reaffirmed a
theme that transcends politics: that another core purpose of the First
Amendment is to guarantee that the people, not the government, get
to determine what they want to say and how they want to say it.7
This liberty-affirming concept celebrates the freedom and autonomy
of each person and group and condemns censorship of thought and
speech by government. It has applications well beyond the political
realm and guarantees the strongest protection to free speech in a
number of settings, including artistic, corporate, and commercial
speech. In all of these areas the Roberts Court affirmed that the First
Amendment presumption against government censorship is but
another recognition and manifestation of individual and group
4

In one of the presidential debates in 1980 with incumbent President Jimmy
Carter, Ronald Reagan asked the public, rhetorically, “Are you better off now than
you were four years ago?” Bret Schulte, Ronald Reagan v. Jimmy Carter: “Are
You Better Off Now than You Were Four Years Ago?”, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 17, 2008),
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2008/01/17/the-actor-and-the-detailman.
5
Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
6
See cases cited infra Section I.B.2.
7
See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442
(2014) (invalidating federal statute that imposed aggregate limits on contributions
that any one person could make to candidates and parties even if the donor chose
to support a wide range of candidates and groups); Brown, 564 U.S. at 790–92
(invalidating statute which prevented individuals from access to violent video
games); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (striking down campaign finance
restrictions that interfere with the rights of people and their groups to determine
for themselves how to engage in political speech and association).
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freedom and liberty.8 Similarly, the Court has generally been
extremely vigilant against laws where government seeks to regulate
speech on the basis of content.9 And the Court has also generally
insisted that all speakers and methods of communicating be afforded
equal status under the First Amendment, rejecting any perceived
free speech caste system where government privileges some
speakers over others.10 Instead, “First Amendment rights should be
unified, universal, and indivisible.”11 The Court has also generally
resisted efforts to balance free speech against other values and
interests, preferring instead to try to find firmer, more categorical
rules which seek to place First Amendment rights beyond the
discretionary pale even of judges themselves.12 It gave more
8

See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371–73; Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564
U.S. 552, 576–80 (2011); Brown, 564 U.S. at 799–804.
9
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230–31 (2015)
(discussing that the town’s sign Code singles out specific subject matter for
differential treatment, making it a form of content-based discrimination and
therefore cannot stand because it does not pass the strict scrutiny test). But see
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (stating that the State’s
judicial conduct rule prohibiting judicial candidates from personally soliciting
campaign funds served the compelling state interest of preventing the appearance
of impropriety).
10
See, e.g., McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1463 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(discussing that the Court “has never required a speaker to explain the reasons for
his position in order to obtain full First Amendment Protection. Instead, [the
Court] ha[s] consistently held that speech is protected even ‘when the underlying
basis for a position is not given’”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (stating that
“restricting distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but
not others” are prohibited).
11
Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST. L. REV. 935,
939 (2011) [hereinafter Gora, United].
12
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”);
Brown, 564 U.S. at 792 (referring back to Stevens, the Court discussed how the
government in Stevens argued that lack of a historical warrant did not matter and
that it could create new categories of unprotected speech by applying a “simple
balancing test” that weighs the value of a particular category of speech against its
social costs and then punishes that category of speech if it fails the test—however,
the Court rejected this contention); United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537,
2547 (2012) (citing to Brown, the Court stated that “[b]efore exempting a category
of speech from the normal prohibition on content-based restrictions . . . the Court
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prominence to the right of listeners and audiences to receive ideas
and hear what speakers had to say. Thus, the Roberts Court has
usually put its thumb strongly on the First Amendment side of the
scale.
Applying these principles, the Court has steadfastly refused to
declare speech that many deemed socially worthless to be beyond
the pale of the First Amendment’s protection.13 In rejecting
government efforts to criminalize depictions of animal cruelty,
regulate the sale of violent video games to young people, punish
those who lie about receiving military honors and permit damages
to the targets of even hateful and hurtful slurs and insults, the Court
reaffirmed that it is the individual, not the government, who must
judge the worth of such speech.14 In those cases the Court
emphatically refused to expand the very short list of “non-speech”
exceptions from First Amendment protection, such as, obscenity and
fighting words.15 Nor was the Court willing to permit government
to regulate even such prosaic items as street or yard signs on the
basis of their content.16
To be sure, the Roberts Court has not invariably ruled in favor
of free speech claims.17 It has allowed government, in some
circumstances, to censor student speech,18 government employee

must be presented with ‘persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is
part of a long . . . tradition of proscription[]’” but the government did not
demonstrate that in this case).
13
See, e.g., Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (holding Federal law criminalizing
creation, sale or possession of depictions of animal cruelty to be overbroad under
the First Amendment); Brown, 564 U.S. 786 (striking down California law
imposing restrictions on the sale of violent video games); Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537
(holding Stolen Valor Act was unconstitutional though respondent falsely claimed
to have received Medal of Honor).
14
See discussion infra Section I.B.1.
15
See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469–70; Brown, 564 U.S. at 792; Alvarez, 132 S.
Ct. at 2546–47.
16
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230–31 (2015).
17
See discussion infra Part II.
18
See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (“The question
thus becomes whether a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment,
restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed
as promoting illegal drug use. We hold that she may.”).
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speech,19 certain forms of campaign funding associated with
elections to judicial office,20 and speech supporting terrorist
organizations.21 It has also given government some leeway to
control speech on or utilizing government property.22 But these few
exceptions help prove the rule that, outside these few instances, the
Roberts Court insisted on rigorously protecting free speech to
preserve vital individual and societal First Amendment values. The
same regard for the individual can also be found in a number of
significant cases where the Court has protected religious freedom
against the demands of government, including safeguarding the
rights of a church to determine whom to hire as a teacher, a familyheld company to resist providing health care insurance against its
religious convictions, a Muslim prisoner to wear a beard for
religious reasons despite prison security concerns, and an employee
to wear a religious head scarf despite a company’s dress code
appearance rules.23 In all of these cases, the Court privileged
individual religious preferences over the government’s claimed
need to permit the intrusion on such conscientious objection. And in
the process, as with the Court’s free speech work, individual
sovereignty was expanded and government intrusion contracted.
But that Roberts Court, that very First Amendment-friendly
Roberts Court, seemed, sadly, to come suddenly to an end on
February 13, 2016, with the abrupt and untimely death of Justice
Antonin Scalia, a staunch supporter during his long career on the
19

See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–25 (2006) (“[T]he First
Amendment does not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee’s
expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.”).
20
See, e.g., Williams Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1661 (2015)
(“Florida has reasonably determined that personal appeals for money by a judicial
candidate inherently create an appearance of impropriety that may cause the
public to lose confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”).
21
See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 6 (2010) (“[The
court] simply holds that § 2339B does not violate the freedom of speech as applied
to the particular types of support these plaintiffs seek to provide.”).
22
See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S.
Ct. 2239 (2015) (holding that government license plate designs were government
speech and thus permissible); Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009)
(holding that the government could determine what monuments to place in a
public park because that choice is a form of government speech).
23
See discussion infra Section I.B.3.b.
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Court of many of its strongest free speech cases.24 As a result, grave
doubt arose as to whether the Supreme Court would continue to be
the surprisingly powerful voice for free speech that it has become,
and the future of free speech and the First Amendment seemed to
hang in the balance, on the reasonable expectation that a Democratic
President would probably be elected and would appoint Justice
Scalia’s successor.25
Indeed, dissenting Justices and prominent legal scholars have
taken sharp issue with various pro-free speech Roberts Court
decisions, insisting that the Court has gone too far in overprotecting
freedom of speech and not properly taking account of and balancing
the needs of government which have been advanced to justify
particular restrictions on speech.26 Other critics write off the Court’s
24

For example, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, Justice
Scalia wrote the Court’s opinion invalidating a California law restricting access
by young people to violent video games and observed:
Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of
protected speech, it is invalid unless California can demonstrate
that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a
compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve
that interest. The State must specifically identify an “actual
problem” in need of solving and the curtailment of free speech
must be actually necessary to the solution. That is a demanding
standard. “It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because
of its content will ever be permissible.”
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (citations omitted);
see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
25
Indeed, two cases already reflect the impact of Justice Scalia’s death. In
one, the Court looked poised to rule that it violated the First Amendment for nonmembers of public sector unions to be compelled to provide financial support for
the advocacy of those unions, even as it pertained to collective bargaining matters,
but the lower court union victory wound up being affirmed by an equally divided
Court. See Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016). In another
case, a further effort to resist compliance with Obamacare contraceptive provision
insurance mandates by a pro-life religious order was also derailed and remanded
by a diminished Court. See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)
26
For some of the more prominent academic critics of the Robert Court’s
First Amendment work, see BURT NEUBORNE, ON READING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: MADISON’S MUSIC (2015); RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS
UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF
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free speech jurisprudence as simple right-wing favoritism of the rich
and the powerful, insisting instead that the First Amendment should
mainly protect just the deserving “lonely pamphleteer” or “soapbox
orator” of an earlier era.27 Ironically, liberals who usually led the
fight for free speech a generation ago are more likely to be leading
the charge to restrict free speech today, both on and off the Court.
The Roberts Court, however, steadfastly maintained that the First
Amendment must be available to every person or group who would
seek to exercise its rights and has refused to curtail free speech
protection.28 In taking that position, the Roberts Court relied on free
speech themes sounded in earlier, more “liberal” eras of the Court,
building upon and strengthening the foundational pillars of free
speech erected by the great Justices like Holmes, Brandeis, Black,
and Douglas.
The death of Justice Scalia, the political battle over his
replacement, and what seemed the likely outcome of the 2016
elections seemed to make it probable that a Democratic nominee
would replace Justice Scalia, one unlikely to share his usually strong
pro-free speech views. That outcome, no matter how well-meaning
the successor, would have posed a serious peril to strong free speech
protection and lead almost certainly to a critical shift in the

AMERICAN ELECTIONS (2016); LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN
JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014); STEVEN SHIFFRIN,
WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2016); Steven Shiffrin, The Dark
Side of the First Amendment, 61 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1480 (2014); Robert Post &
Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV L. REV. F. 165
(2015); Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 1431 (2013).
27
See NEUBORNE, supra note 26, at 10. See generally David Kairys, The
Contradictory Messages of the Rehnquist-Roberts Era Speech Law: Liberty and
Justice for Some, 2013 U. ILL. LAW REV. 195 (discussing how free speech is used
to favor the wealthy in the area of campaign finance); Adam Liptak, Sidebar: First
Amendment, ‘Patron Saint’ of Protestors, Is Embraced by Corporations, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/us/first-amendmentpatron-saint-of-protesters-is-embraced-by-corporations.html?_r=0 (describing how
some say free speech has become a tool for the Republican Party and the wealthy
to promote conservative agenda).
28
See discussion infra Part I (detailing the expansion of free speech rights
under the Roberts Court).
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balance.29 But the surprising election of Donald Trump as President
and his pledge to nominate Justices in “the mold of Justice Scalia,”
made it much more likely that the Roberts Court as a strong
protector of First Amendment rights would continue. Indeed, the
nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch, seemingly a strong supporter of
such rights, increases this likelihood and will help provide a judicial
bulwark against some of the disparaging views on free speech—he
would penalize flag burning—and free press—he would relax the
restraints on defamation suits—that President Trump seems to hold.30
The loss of a powerful pro-free speech Court would be troubling
for one final, and ironic reason. In a time when the Supreme Court
was affording more free speech protection in its legal rulings than
almost any predecessor Court, in everyday life, these are trying
times for free speech. Censorship seems to reign, both at home and
abroad, in what sometimes seems to be a war on free speech.
Whether it be the instantaneous condemnation and punishment of
fraternity members for singing racially offensive lyrics at a social
event, the brazen murder of journalists for producing anti-Muslim
cartoons and commentary, or the cancelling of celebrity contracts
for making offensive remarks or expressing unpopular views, free
speech in everyday life seems often under attack and in jeopardy.31
Enhanced by technology, and the phenomenon of “going viral,” one
slip of the tongue, caught on camera or recorder, can ruin an
individual’s career or life prospects. Technology has also facilitated
unprecedented surveillance of citizens,32 which can create a new
29

Within days of Justice Scalia’s death, one observer commenting on key
Roberts Court precedents now at risk, was already writing the epitaph for the
Citizens United decision: “Some would go quickly like Citizens United.” Adam
Liptak, Supreme Court Appointment Could Reshape American Life, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/us/politics/scalias-deathoffers-best-chance-in-a-generation-to-reshape-supreme-court.html.
30
See David Cole, Donald Trump vs. The First Amendment, NATION (Jan.
18, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/donald-trump-vs-the-first-amendment/.
31
See infra text accompanying notes 268–78.
32
See generally SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON
TERROR AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011) (discussing data
collection by financial institutions for surveillance purposes); ANDREW P.
NAPOLITANO, SUICIDE PACT: THE RADICAL EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWERS AND THE LETHAL THREAT TO AMERICAN LIBERTY (2014) (discussing
the use of drone technology for international and domestic surveillance).
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form of chilling effect to suppress criticism of government. And, too
often, our campuses, rather than being sanctuaries of free speech,
thought, and inquiry, are venues for suppression and censorship of
offensive or “hurtful” ideas and the provision of “safe spaces” from
free speech.33 The very presence of these sweeping restrictions on
speech on campus and in the workplace can have the proverbial
chilling effect of silencing a great range of speech which could not
legally be punished, because as one Justice once said: “the value of
a Sword of Damocles is that it hangs, not that it drops.”34
In the face of these various suppressions of speech, it is
imperative, in my view, that at least where the law is concerned the
Supreme Court continue to make it quite clear that free speech must
be the rule and government censorship the rare exception. For the
reasons that follow, that would be faithful to the Roberts Court’s
First Amendment legacy
This article will analyze and assess that legacy and support its
preservation. First, I will discuss the overall First Amendmentprotective themes and principles that the Roberts Court has
reaffirmed and strengthened. Then, the focus shifts to how the
Roberts Court has applied those principles in a speech-protective
fashion. This discussion describes the Court’s powerful refusal to
create new “non-speech” categories of censorship, its strong
protection of speech and association in the campaign finance area,
the expansion of individual choice about speech and religion and the
concomitant restriction of government sovereignty over such
matters, the strengthening of the important anticensorship content
neutrality principles, the protection of speaker equality, and finally,
the reluctance to balance First Amendment rights against competing
33

See Nadine Strossen, Freedom of Speech and Equality: Do We Have to
Choose?, 25 J. L. & POL’Y 185, 187 (2017); Conor Friedersdorf, The Glaring
Evidence That Free Speech is Threatened on Campus, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/the-glaring-evidence-that-freespeech-is-threatened-on-campus/471825/; Robert Corn-Revere, Hate Speech Laws:
Ratifying the Assassin’s Veto, CATO INST.: POL’Y ANALYSIS, May 24, 2016, no. 791,
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa791.pdf.
34
See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See generally Joel M. Gora, An Essay in Honor of Robert Sedler:
Fierce Champion of Free Speech, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 1087, 1098–1103 (2013)
(discussing how censorship silences constitutionally protected speech in schools
and workplaces).
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values. The article also notes and assesses those areas where the
Court has rejected First Amendment protection and concludes that
they do not overshadow the Court’s strong stance in favor of such
rights. The article concludes by praising the Court for its work, but
notes the concerns that in everyday life, free speech often seems to
be denied the same high regard.
I. THE ROBERTS COURT’S LEGACY: FREE SPEECH MATTERS
The Roberts Court left a surprisingly First Amendment friendly
legacy during its ten-year run. It embraced and extended classic free
speech principles and applied them in a number of different areas.
This section will identify those principles and trace the Roberts’
Court’s decisions protecting and reaffirming them in those various areas.
A. Summary of Principles and Themes
In its ten-year run prior to Justice Scalia’s death, the Roberts
Court decided approximately forty First Amendment cases, most of
which involved free speech.35 Many of those cases have continued
or revived some of the strongest free speech-protective themes and
doctrines from an earlier era, expanded the zone of protection of free
speech in a number of contexts, and rebuffed efforts to contract that
zone by refusing to recognize a variety of new “non-speech”
categories of prohibition.36 As a cause and consequence, the Roberts
Court has done so by enlarging the zone of individual and group
liberty where free speech is concerned, contracted the area of
government sovereignty over speech, and left free speech far more
35

See Ronald K.L. Collins, CJ Roberts: Mr. First Amendment – The Trend
Continues,
CONCURRING OPINIONS: FAN 63
(June
10,
2015),
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2015/06/fan-63-first-amendment-news-cjroberts-mr-first-amendment-the-trend-continues.html (listing all cases). See
generally Symposium, The First Amendment, 76 ALBANY L. REV. 409–781
(2013) (discussing different First Amendment cases the Roberts Court heard);
Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Exceptional Freedom – The Roberts Court, The
First Amendment and the New Absolutism, 76 ALBANY L. REV. 409 (2013)
[hereinafter Collins, Exceptional Freedom] (providing an overview of Roberts
Court First Amendment cases).
36
These issues, themes and cases are discussed in Part I of this Article. Cases
that have rejected First Amendment protection are analyzed in Part II.
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protected than it found it ten years ago. The Court’s First
Amendment
jurisprudence
reflected
strong
libertarian,
antipaternalistic, and anticensorship themes that are rooted in the
Court’s most powerful First Amendment precedents from earlier
eras including: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,37 Cohen v.
California,38 Buckley v. Valeo,39 Virginia Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,40 Texas v. Johnson,41 and
Reno v. ACLU.42 The holdings of these cases have been preserved
and extended by the Roberts Court.
Taken together, the Roberts Court’s decisions, with a few
notable exceptions, have left constitutional speech rights much
stronger than they were found. To be sure, some First Amendment
claims have been rejected by the Roberts Court.43 But, when one
factors in the quality and nature of the Court’s pro-free speech
decisions, the Court’s rulings and broader First Amendment
doctrinal themes hold up well against any predecessor Court.44
Those themes include a strong libertarian distrust of government
regulation of speech and presumption in favor of letting people
37

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (discussing the First
Amendment in dealing with the issue of libel).
38
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing Cohen’s conviction of
disturbing the peace, on First Amendment grounds, for wearing a jacket stating
“Fuck the Draft”).
39
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (finding a First Amendment violation
where a statute limited campaign expenditures for individuals, groups, and
candidates using personal funds).
40
Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (finding unconstitutional, on First Amendment grounds, a statute
which prohibits pharmacists from publishing or advertising prescription drug
prices).
41
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (affirming the reversal of
Johnson’s conviction, on First Amendment grounds, for burning an American flag
in violation of a statue which prohibits desecration of venerated objects).
42
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (finding
unconstitutional, on First Amendment grounds, a statute “enacted to protect
minors from ‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ communications on the
internet”).
43
See discussion infra Part II.
44
See generally Collins, Exceptional Freedom, supra note 36 (detailing the
powerful protection the Roberts court extended to particular areas of speech that
reach beyond the scope of previous courts).
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control speech, a consistent refusal to fashion new non-speech
categories, a reluctance to “balance” free speech against
governmental interests, and, most notably in the campaign finance
cases, a reaffirmation of the “central meaning” of the First
Amendment, namely, to protect the processes of freedom of speech,
press, and association that make our democracy possible.45 More
specifically, the Court’s legacy has involved invocation of cases
with themes extolling the individual choice over what to say, how
to say it, and when and where to say it, expressing deep skepticism
for permitting government to make those choices and censor the
information and ideas the public may receive.46
The Roberts Court has also revived the concept that the First
Amendment protects both the speaker’s right to communicate and
the listener’s right to receive ideas and information.47 It is not that
these ideas and principles are new; they were powerfully articulated
by the great Justices Holmes and Brandeis almost a century ago,
namely, that the purposes of free speech are both to enable the
individual to exercise their liberty and autonomy, and to ensure that
the community will have all the information they need to live and to
govern.48 Free speech is viewed both as an end in itself to better
human growth and development and as a means to a better society.

45

See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment”, 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191.
46
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 353–56
(2010) (finding a law that bans corporations from using their general treasury
funds to support or criticize election candidates an unconstitutional attempt to
censor protected speech); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 522, 577–80
(2011) (finding a law that regulates certain speech of the pharmaceutical industry
an unconstitutional attempt to censor protected speech).
47
See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 353–56 (stating it is unlawful for the
Government to control thought through targeted censorship of speakers and
listeners ); Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 577–80 (finding the Government unable to quiet
speech they deem “too persuasive” by its messengers to the public); Brown v.
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (stating the Government has
limited authority in restricting expression based on a content’s message).
48
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672–73 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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In honoring these principles, the Roberts Court has provided
greater protection than ever before in the area of campaign finance
regulation, striking down a number of laws which restricted the
ability of individuals and groups to fund their political ideas and
campaigns.49 The Court has broadened the protections against
content-based restrictions of speech in the public arena50 and has
restricted the ability of government to use its funding powers to
restrict or compel the speech of government beneficiaries.51 In the
parallel First Amendment area of religious freedom, the Court has
generally honored claims of the need to value religious observance
over government interests, thus liberating religious conscience and
expression, and, in cases rejecting claims of improper government
endorsement or support of religion, has expanded the realm of
individual choice of speech and belief and contracted the realm of
government supremacy.52 Non-union members have seen their First
Amendment right to refuse to support union activities expand.53
Efforts to create new categories of non-speech protection have been
decisively rebuffed, as have attempts to “balance” free speech
against other interests.54 Finally, it is difficult to identify any First
Amendment areas where rights have been rolled back.
Critics say that the Roberts Court is a faux free speech Court,
which has not been that hospitable to free speech, absent a few
isolated opinions, such as the funeral protest case, or when corporate
or moneyed interests are doing the talking, as in the campaign

49

See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014);
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372.
50
See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (holding that a
law prohibiting the display of outdoor signs without a permit but exempting
ideological or political signs is a content-based restriction on speech that does not
survive strict scrutiny).
51
See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321
(2013) (holding that the restriction of funds meant to combat HIV/Aids,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria to organizations with policies explicitly opposing
prostitution and sex trafficking violates the First Amendment).
52
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2782 (2014);
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014).
53
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014).
54
See cases cited infra notes 72–95.
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finance cases or commercial speech cases.55 The effort is to paint
the Roberts Court as a right-wing Court across the board, with its
free speech rulings being no exception.56 But the truth of the matter
is that the Court has handed down a number of crucial rulings that
could not have pleased people on the right, but were consistent with
protecting free speech principles.57 Overall, the Roberts Court in
most instances vigorously protected free speech and other First
Amendment values regardless of the ideological or partisan
consequences of the decisions.
Finally, two time-honored, complimentary themes have animated
much of the pro-free speech Roberts Court decisions: the libertarian
individual rights concept that we protect free speech so that
individuals and the groups they form will have the maximum
freedom to choose for themselves how and whether to speak,58 and
the bookend, anticensorship principle that the government cannot be
trusted to exercise the power to censor the speech of individuals and
groups.59 Both principles were elegantly framed in a famous 1971

55

See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, Free Speech and the Roberts Court: Uncertain
Protections, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 3, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/03/freespeech-and-the-roberts-court-uncertain-protections/
(discussing
different
instances when the Court has allegedly stripped away First Amendment rights).
56
See sources cited supra note 27.
57
Such cases involved protecting the free speech rights of AIDS workers,
people who lied about receiving military honors, manufacturers of violent video
games and distributors of depictions of animal cruelty. See discussion infra
Sections I.B.1, I.B.3.a.
58
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454–58, 460–61 (2011) (holding
that the First Amendment provided “special protection” to groups picketing on
public streets outside military funerals); Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 353–56 (2010) (“When Government seeks to use its full
power, including the criminal law, to command where a person may get his or her
information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship
to control thought.”).
59
See, e.g., Brown v. Merchs. Entm’t Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011)
(holding that a California statute prohibiting the sale of “violent video games” to
minors violated the First Amendment because it was both overbroad and under
inclusive); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474–77, 482 (2010) (holding
that a statute criminalizing the portrayal of animal cruelty was “substantially
overbroad, and therefore invalid under the First Amendment”).
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case, Cohen v. California, holding that the word “fuck” could not be
categorically banned from public display or discourse:
The constitutional right of free expression is
powerful medicine in a society as diverse and
populous as ours. It is designed and intended to
remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision as to what
views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each
of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and
more perfect polity and in the belief that no other
approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our
political system rests.60
A few years later, the same theme was sounded in the Court’s
landmark campaign finance ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, holding that
the government could not impose limits on how much political
speech that people and the groups they form could have:
The First Amendment denies government the power
to determine that spending to promote one’s political
views is wasteful, excessive or unwise. In the free
society ordained by our Constitution it is not the
government, but the people individually as citizens
and candidates and collectively as associations and
political committees who must retain control over the
quantity and range of debate on public issues in a
political campaign.61
In another landmark ruling of that era, the Burger Court applied
similar libertarian and anticensorship principles to efforts to control
purely commercial speech about consumer goods, invoking the
same themes of speaker and listener autonomy to choose what to say
or hear.62 The Court concluded that the choice between permitting
“highly paternalistic” government control of speech or letting
people have the information and make up their own minds, was a
60

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976).
62
Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 757 (1976) (“If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to
receive the advertising . . . ”).
61
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choice already made for us in the First Amendment’s rejection of
government censorship.63 Embracing these themes, in later cases,
the Court would insist that even the most hateful, hurtful ideas about
racial or religious equality, or expressions of contempt or hatred for
America, even by publicly burning the American flag, could not be
censored by government.64 In a similar vein, broad-scale efforts to
censor sexual content on the Internet, to protect children, were also
rebuffed on the ground that “the vast democratic forums of the
Internet,” should not be subject to overly vague and sweeping
controls.65
The Roberts Court has been more than willing to pick up these
libertarian and anticensorship themes and principles and apply them
in modern times to a wide range of government restrictions of
political speech. In a few short years, the Roberts Court handed
down several decisions that even the Warren Court, let alone the
Burger Court, would be proud to claim.66
Buckley’s embrace of these themes would become a central
feature in the Roberts Court’s campaign finance canon,67 and
especially its Citizens United decision, embodying the concept that
government still could not control the range of speech that speakers
choose to communicate and listeners choose to receive.68 To allow
that government control would allow “censorship . . . vast in its

63

Id. at 770.
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag burning
was conduct protected by the First Amendment); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443
(2011) (holding that picketing at a serviceman’s funeral with signs reading, for
example, “Thank God for 9/11,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and “God Hates
Fags” was allowed under the First Amendment).
65
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868–69 (1997).
66
See Robert A. Sedler, The “Law of the First Amendment” Revisited, 58
WAYNE L. REV. 1003, 1026–27 (2013); Collins, Exceptional Freedom, supra note
36, 432–35. The themes have played out in cases involving such disparate
contexts as campaign finance regulation, violent content of videos and video
games, hurtful hateful speech, government funding of speech, government
regulation of the time place and manner of speech. See Collins, Exceptional
Freedom, supra note 36, 428–36, 453–55.
67
See discussion infra Sections I.A.2.b–c.
68
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354–56
(2010).
64
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reach.”69 The more recent ruling in McCutcheon v. Federal Election
Commission70 likewise sounded these themes of individual choice
about how to speak about and participate in the political process and
what limits must be imposed on government efforts to control such
choices. These libertarian and anticensorship principles would also
animate important Roberts Court rulings invalidating state
restrictions on youthful access to violent video games,71 on the use of
pharmaceutical information by drug companies,72 and, most
powerfully, on monetary penalties on hurtful and hateful anti-gay
speech.73
B. Application of These Principles and Themes
1. No New Non-Speech Categories
In four cases arising in disparate areas of the law, but posing
similar questions of categorical exclusion from free speech
protection, the Roberts Court decisively rejected such exclusion and
made it quite clear that any proposed new non-speech category
would have an extreme uphill climb to success.74 Even though each
of the laws at issue commanded wide-spread popular support, the
Roberts Court did not hesitate to invoke the principles of the First
Amendment to strike them down.75
69

Id. at 354. For further discussion of Citizens United, see Kathleen Sullivan,
Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 123 (2010).
70
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014).
71
See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011).
72
See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
73
See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 455–60 (2011).
74
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (holding
“depictions of animal cruelty” are not considered an unprotected class); Snyder,
562 U.S. at 460–61 (holding Westboro’s speech could not be restricted because
of its upsetting content); Brown, 564 U.S. at 792–93 (holding that the First
amendment prohibits regulating “whatever a legislature finds shocking”); United
States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (holding that the Government has
not demonstrated that false statements constitute a new category of unprotected
speech on this basis).
75
See generally John D. Moore, The Closed and Shrinking Frontier of
Unprotected Speech, 36 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2014) (discussing the
Roberts Court’s method in evaluating what constitutes free speech).
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In the first case, United States v. Stevens,76 the Court refused to
permit Congress to outlaw so-called “crush videos” that depicted
vicious acts of animal cruelty and were of interest to certain sexual
fetishists.77 While the acts of cruelty could be punished as illegal
conduct, the Court ruled that the speech depicting those acts was
protected by the First Amendment, which
reflects a judgment by the American people that the
benefits of its restrictions on the Government
outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any
attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis
that some speech is not worth it. The Constitution is
not a document “prescribing limits, and declaring
that those limits may be passed at pleasure.”78
Indeed, the Court strongly suggested that no new non-speech
categories might ever be created if they had not already been
recognized by our history and tradition, especially not by a process
of ad hoc balancing which would measure the value of the speech
against its harm.79 Chief Justice Roberts rejected such a “highly
manipulable balancing test” as a “startling and dangerous” threat to
the First Amendment.80 The late Justice Hugo L. Black, known for
his antipathy to balancing free speech against government interests,
would have been pleased.81
Next came the challenge to a California statute restricting the
sale of “violent video games” to minors under the age of eighteen in
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, which followed the
approach in Stevens.82 The Court strongly condemned the contentbased statute and harshly rejected the creation of a new category for
violent content, even where minors were concerned.83 The Court
76

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
Id. at 465–66.
78
Id. at 470.
79
Id. at 472.
80
Id. at 470–72.
81
See Raymond G. Decker, Justice Hugo L. Black, The Balancer of
Absolutes, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1338 (1971) (noting Justice Black’s “insistence
upon the importance of the first amendment” and describing his disapproving
approach to balancing the individual and societal interest).
82
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 789 (2011).
83
Id. at 793–99.
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made it clear that the stronger the popular sentiment to suppress the
content of certain speech, the more the need for serious strict
scrutiny to ensure that it is real harms, not loathsome ideas, in the
government’s sights.84 In the process, these two cases undermined
some older precedents which had long been thought to justify
prohibiting “worthless” speech, or speech targeting,85 or harming
young people.86 And they did so with strong invocation of the
libertarian and anticensorship themes which have become a
hallmark of Roberts Court First Amendment jurisprudence.
A third case, United States v. Alvarez, also challenged a
politically popular Congressional statute, the Stolen Valor Act,
which punished those who falsely claimed to have been awarded
military medals, and was justified on the ground that a new category
of materially false speech should be created as an exception to First
Amendment protection. The Court once again refused to create a
new non-speech category even for those who demean and dishonor
military medals by falsely claiming they had earned them.87 A sixthree majority, though divided on the rationale, struck down the Act
and refused to exempt from First Amendment protection all
knowingly false speech, noting that:
The Nation well knows that one of the costs of the
First Amendment is that it protects the speech we
detest as well as the speech we embrace. Though few
might find [the defendant’s] statements anything but
contemptible, his right to make those statements is
protected by the Constitution’s guarantee of freedom
of expression.88
Once again, the Court had rebuffed the government’s argument for
creating new non-speech categories that would automatically
withhold First Amendment protection from speech within such
categories.89
84

See id. at 799.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
86
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968).
87
See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012).
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Id. at 2551.
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Id. at 2543.
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Finally, in another case involving hateful, hurtful speech, the
Court once again countered popular opinion and majority sentiment
in order to vindicate First Amendment values by refusing to
recognize a new “hate speech” exception to First Amendment
protection, in Snyder v. Phelps.90 The anticensorship theme was
clearly sounded in the case involving extremely hurtful, offensive,
outrageous, and abusive speech targeted at the family of a deceased
soldier, on the day of his funeral.91 It is difficult to imagine more
wounding speech; a “vicious verbal assault” as the lone dissenting
Justice Samuel Alito characterized it.92 Nonetheless, Chief Justice
Roberts, for a majority of the Court, held that no matter how bizarre
the speech or the speaker—in this case, the Westboro Baptist
Church, a fringe fundamentalist church taunting grieving families
by preposterously claiming that America’s soldiers were dying as
punishment for America’s growing tolerance of homosexuality—it
was protected by the First Amendment.93 As he had in Stevens,
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged the power of speech to have a
harmful impact and made plain that this was not sufficient grounds
to restrict it:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move
them to tears of both joy and sorrow and—as it did
here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we
cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As
a Nation we have chosen a different course—to
protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure
that we do not stifle public debate.94
It would seem to me these cases alone are enough to make the
Court that produced them worthy of praise as a highly speechprotective institution, safeguarding free speech regardless of popular
sentiment. And these cases may have some lasting precedential
force, even though two of them, Alvarez and Brown, drew some
dissenting and concurring opinions. With the death of Justice Scalia,
the same prediction of longevity seemed to be cast into considerable
90
91
92
93
94

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
Id. at 448–50.
Id. at 463 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 448, 458–61.
Id. at 460–61.
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doubt with respect to the Roberts Court’s campaign finance cases,
which, as we will now see, were consistently sharply divided five to
four decisions. With a President Trump, however, there may very
well be more adherence than resistance to Roberts Court rulings,
including in the campaign finance area.
2. The Campaign Finance Cases
Only someone vacationing on Mars could be unaware that the
Court’s campaign finance cases have garnered not praise, but
condemnation, especially the most widely criticized ruling in the
Citizens United case.95 I think that is a constitutional shame because
the Court’s ruling embodied and applied classic First Amendment
principles, including many of the ones identified above, especially
the notion that it is the people, not the government, that must
determine the nature and range of political speech, and that to permit
the government to do so invites the kind of censorship anathema to
the First Amendment.96 Happily, though most academic and

95

In an unprecedented action, President Barack Obama attacked the
Court’s decision in a press conference the day it was handed down and then
again a few days later before the nation in his State of the Union address. See
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement from
the President on Today’s Supreme Court Decision (Jan. 21, 2010),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/statement-presidenttodays-supreme-court-decision-0 (“With its ruling today, the Supreme Court has
given a green light to a new stampede of special interest money in our politics. It
is a major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and
the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in Washington to
drown out the voices of everyday Americans. This ruling gives the special
interests and their lobbyists even more power in Washington—while
undermining the influence of average Americans who make small contributions
to support their preferred candidates.”); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare
Rebuke, In Front of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/politics/29scotus.html [hereinafter Liptak,
Supreme Court Gets Rare Rebuke]. The Democratic Party has called for a
constitutional amendment to overturn the decision. See The 2016 Democratic
Party Platform, https://www.democrats.org/party-platform#campaign-finance
(last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
96
See Gora, United, supra note 12; Joel M. Gora, In the Business of Free
Speech, The Roberts Court and Citizens United, in BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS
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professional opinion is unyieldingly against the decision, there are
some First Amendment stalwarts who recognize it as a vital and
strong bastion of free speech.97 Indeed, the Court’s campaign
finance canon gave the greatest protection to the funding of political
speech of any Court since the landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo
in 1976.98 In doing so, the Roberts Court came closer than any
predecessor Court to invalidating all limits on giving and spending
funds for political speech.99
It is hard to imagine a group more deserving of First Amendment
protection than Citizens United, a nonpartisan issue and political
advocacy organization, that created a movie harshly critical of thenSenator Hillary Clinton who was beginning her first run for
President in 2008.100 Their model was the popular Michael Moore
cinematic election year assault against President George W. Bush in
COURT 227 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016) [hereinafter Gora, Business of Free
Speech].
97
See Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
77 (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/citizens-united-andits-critics; Michael W. McConnell, Essay: Reconsidering Citizens United as a
Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 414 (2013); Sullivan, supra note 68, 143–
44; Ira Glasser, Understanding the Citizens United Ruling, HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ira-glasser/understanding-theemcitiz_b_447342.html; Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The
Constitutional Right That Big Corporations Should Have But Do Not Want, 34
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 640 (2011); Martin H. Redish & Peter B. Siegal,
Constitutional Adjudication: Free Expression and the Fashionable Art of
Corporation Bashing, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (2013); Bradley A. Smith,
Citizens United Gives Freedom of Speech Back to the People, REUTERS: GREAT
DEBATE (Jan. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/01/16/citizensunited-gives-freedom-of-speech-back-to-the-people/.
98
Multiple cases comprise the Roberts Court campaign finance canon. See
McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Ariz. Free Enter.
Club’s Freedom Political Action Comm. v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721 (2011);
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n; 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Davis v. Fed.
Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724 (2009); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to
Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
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A deregulatory position espoused, at least until 2010, by the hardly
conservative American Civil Liberties Union. See Floyd Abrams et al., The ACLU
Approves Limits on Speech, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274
8704423504575212152820875486.
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See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319–20.

FREE SPEECH MATTERS

87

2004 entitled, Fahrenheit 911.101 The Citizens United group wanted
to promote and distribute its movie on cable, on demand, and in
movie theaters.102 However, because it was a corporation, albeit a
nonprofit one, the federal campaign finance laws made doing so a
federal crime.103 Those laws prohibited any corporation and, for
good measure, any labor union, from spending their funds for
candidate-related advocacy.104 So, here you had a law which made
it a crime for a group to put out a movie criticizing a major candidate
for the Presidency of the United States, in a country with a First
Amendment which says that “Congress shall . . . make no law
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”105 One would
think a case like that would have been almost a per se violation of
that sacred commandment. But under the incredibly complex, often
Byzantine campaign finance rules prior to Citizens United, that was
not the case. The Roberts Court would fix that by applying settled
principles going back a generation to hold that limiting the ability of
individuals and groups to spend funds to express their views on
government and the politicians who run it was a violation of the core
principles of the First Amendment.106
a. Background
A little background is in order. The Court’s campaign finance
law has gone through three eras since the landmark 1976 ruling in
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See Philip Rucker, Citizens United used ‘Hillary: The Movie,’ to Take on
McCain-Feingold, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/01/21/AR2010012103582.html.
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Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 320.
103
See id. at 320–21 (discussing federal statute 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) and the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 which “prohibit corporations and
unions from using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to
candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with certain
qualified federal elections”).
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See id.
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See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Buckley v. Valeo,107 the Court’s first encounter with the clash
between campaign finance law restrictions and First Amendment
rights. In that case the Court addressed the massive, post-Watergate
restrictions on campaign funding contained in the new Federal
Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).108 Under the FECA, almost
every dollar spent on politics was subject to regulation, prohibition,
limitation, and disclosure.109 The Court fashioned a constitutional
compromise which struck down limits on campaign speech and
expenditures by candidates, parties, and independent groups as
cutting too close to the core of free speech, but upheld limits on
contributions made directly to candidates and campaigns because of
their presumed potential for corruption.110 For a quarter of a century
the Court applied that basic divide to strike down laws which
restricted expenditures, while being more deferential to laws
limiting contributions.111 But the Court consistently insisted that all
such laws operated at the heart of the Constitution’s core protections
of political speech and association so vital to a vibrant democracy.112
Then, in a handful of cases from 2000 to 2003, the Court took a
different tack, one which was far more deferential to campaign
finance limitations, expanded the concept of the kind of undue
107

See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that limits on
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access and influence facilitated by campaign funding that could
justify regulation, and relied on the expertise of elected politicians
to decide what kinds of political funding might undermine
representative democracy.113 For many, however, that was
tantamount to letting the fox guard the henhouse: deferring to
incumbents to set campaign finance limitations for future campaigns
where they may be challenged.114 During this phase, the Court
upheld extremely low limits on campaign contributions—which
generally hurts challengers and helps incumbents115—and
restrictions on the abilities of political parties to spend funds to help
their candidates speak to voters;116 affirmed bans on political
contributions by nonprofit organizations, even ones free to make
independent expenditures;117 and, finally, recognized the power of
Congress to expand its authority over all groups seeking to mobilize
voters or inform the public about politicians and candidates.118 That
last decision, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,119
involved the well-known McCain-Feingold law, the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act, which was an unprecedented federal effort
to regulate the funding of political communication and was
challenged by some of the top business, labor, and nonprofit
organizations across the political spectrum in America, including
the United States Chamber of Commerce, the American Federation
of Labor, the National Rifle Association, and the ACLU, as well as
the Republican National Committee and key state Democratic party
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groups.120 Nonetheless, a five-four Court upheld most of these
restrictions in a decision, rarely seen in a First Amendment case,
where the Court deferred to legislators who had created sweeping
restraints on speech and association in an area of embedded
Congressional self-interest.121
b.

Enter the Roberts Court

The emergence of the Roberts Court, in February 2006,
dramatically changed the campaign finance as political speech
landscape, especially the replacement of Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor with Justice Samuel Alito, who would be much more
skeptical of campaign finance controls’ consistency with First
Amendment principles.122 As a result, the Court’s campaign finance
jurisprudence became much more First Amendment protective. In a
string of six consecutive cases,123 the Court restored the First
Amendment to the primacy it deserves. First came a case striking
down unconstitutionally low Vermont state contribution and
expenditure limits, with the new Chief Justice, during oral argument,
being openly skeptical of the government’s talismanic incantation
of “corruption” as a justification for the repressive financial
restrictions on political speech and association.124 In the next case,
Chief Justice Roberts limited McConnell’s impact by reasoning that
only issue advocacy that was the “functional equivalent of express
advocacy” could be limited when engaged in by corporations or
unions.125 That took a big bite out of the law and returned to
120
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constitutional principles enunciated in Buckley. A third case, which
put another crimp in the Congressional effort to restrict electoral
advocacy by limiting its funding, involved a cynical effort by
Congress to manipulate contribution limits—raising them
threefold—for any candidate who was facing a self-funded
opponent, as a way to deter such campaigns.126 As it turned out, the
people who took advantage of this law most frequently were
incumbents, seeking to use it against challengers who were spending
their own funds—the least corrupting form of funding imaginable.
In striking down this unusual mechanism, the Court made it clear
that it would no longer defer to what a Congress full of incumbents
said was needed to improve our politics.127 For the Roberts Court,
campaign finance reform did not mean reform of the other
candidate’s campaign finances.
c. The Citizens United Decision
This would all set the stage for the landmark Citizens United
decision in 2010. As I indicated at the outset, the facts of the case
seemed almost per se to cry out for First Amendment protection of
an organization’s speech criticizing a candidate for President of the
United States and urging her defeat. And the Court did not
disappoint First Amendment supporters. In order to afford that
protection, the Court had to restore the full force of two cases:
Buckley and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,128 which,
together, had ruled that the First Amendment permitted no financial
limitations—of either source or amount—on independent speakers
voicing their views on political candidates and electoral issues.129
Two later cases had departed from those principles in the case of
corporations and labor unions—the McConnell case dealing with
McCain-Feingold, and a Michigan state case, Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce.130 Those cases had seemed to suggest that
the government could limit how much speech any person or group
126
127
128
129
130

Davis, 554 U.S. at 729–37.
See id. at 738.
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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could have,131 a principle fundamentally inconsistent with the First
Amendment and democratic values. In Citizens United, the Court
disagreed and declared that free speech is not the enemy of
democracy; it is the engine of democracy.132 And more funding of
political speech was not the problem; it was the solution.133
Despite the popular misconception, the Court did not rule that
corporations are people or that they have the same exact rights as
people.134 What the Court said is that the First Amendment bars
government from telling any person or group they have had enough
to say about government and politics.135 And such a rule not only
respected the innate rights of the speaker, but the correlative rights
of the audience to hear what the speaker had to say and to get as
much information as possible, from as many sources as possible, to
ensure that democratic decision-making is as informed as possible.
As the Court put it:
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it
to others, the Government deprives the
disadvantaged person or class of the right to use
speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and
respect for the speaker’s voice. The Government may
not by these means deprive the public of the right and
privilege to determine for itself what speech and
speakers are worthy of consideration. The First
Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the
ideas that flow from each.136
These themes not only reflect the libertarian cast to the Roberts
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, but also revive a theme
from earlier Court eras that the First Amendment protects the right
to hear and receive ideas, as well as the right to communicate
them.137
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Once these primary First Amendment principles of not limiting
political speech were reaffirmed by the Citizens United Court, the
application was quite straightforward. Independent political
spending by corporations, nonprofits, and unions was protected by
the core principles of the First Amendment, just as individual speech
would be.138 The fact that such spending was independent
undermined any concerns that the speech would corrupt the
politicians who were the beneficiary. It might give those groups and
individuals greater access to or influence with the favored
politicians, but the Citizens United Court clearly rejected that as the
kind of corruption that should restrict speech and said, to the
contrary, that such responsiveness was a hallmark of democracy, not
a blight on it.139 Finally, the Court observed, if government could
prohibit corporations from speaking merely because they were
corporations, nothing would limit application of this power to media
corporations as well.140 So guaranteeing a free press was as much a
goal of the Citizens United Court as protecting free speech and
association. Any concern with some groups having too much speech
would best be addressed by the time-honored principle of more
speech, not “silence coerced by law,” and disclosure of the sources
of such independent spending would enable the public to judge who
was having how much influence on which politicians.
Speaking of disclosure, this is the one area where the Roberts
Court has been, arguably, less protective than predecessor Courts.
In Citizens United, the Court upheld the requirement that those who
engage in the independent spending now freed from control had to
engage in extensive disclosure about who they were and where the
funding came from.141 Indeed, upholding such broad disclosure was
an important part of the Court’s overall approach: “A campaign
finance system that pairs corporate independent expenditures with
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effective disclosure has not existed before today.”142 The problem is
that routine disclosure of political support, especially for
controversial candidates and causes, can cause substantial
harassment and harm and thereby deter such support. Also, Buckley
restricted the disclosure burdens and requirements to groups or
individuals who engaged in “express advocacy” of the election or
defeat of candidates, a very narrow range of operation which freed
all of the issue advocacy groups in America to criticize the records
of politicians without automatically having to disclose their
members and supporters.143 Unfortunately, the disclosure permitted
by Citizens United seems broader than that permitted by Buckley,
and the current Supreme Court has shown little interest in easing
those burdens.144
Despite these important concerns, Citizens United remains a
landmark of political freedom for its understanding that under the
First Amendment the government should not decide whether we get
to see Hillary: The Movie. We should decide whether to see it and
what we think of it:
Those choices and assessments are not for the
government to make. “The First Amendment
underwrites the freedom to experiment and to create
in the realm of thought and speech. Citizens must be
free to use new forms, and new forums, for the
expression of ideas. The civic discourse belongs to
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the people, and the Government may not prescribe
the means used to conduct it.”145
The dissenters, in an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens,
complained bitterly that corporations, and presumably unions as
well, should not be given the same First Amendment protection as
individuals; that entities could engage in and support political
speech in other ways, thus rebutting the claim of “vast censorship,”
that speaker identity was often a valid basis for restricting speech
and that corporate wealth would be amassed to drown out the voices
of the people, undermining both free speech and democracy.146 In
my view, the dissent’s critiques of the ruling downplayed the fact
that corporations—and unions—have been given First Amendment
protection by the Court for decades; that the so-called “PAC
option”—allowing corporations and unions to assist in the formation
of political action committees that can raise funds from members
and employees—is often far more burdensome and restrictive than
using organizational funds to sponsor a political message, especially
where labor unions and small entities are concerned; and that
instances where speech has been restricted because of the speaker’s
identity tended to involve special circumstances like military
members, government employees, and school students. Finally, in
light of the strict scrutiny mandated by the First Amendment,147 the
feared harms of undue access and influence flowing from spending
money seemed ephemeral and exaggerated as a basis for imposing
the vast censorship of corporate and union political speech
commanded by the statute.
The reaction against the ruling was almost instantaneous and
included an unprecedented attack on the Court by President Barack
Obama during his State of the Union address a few days later.148 The
opinion has become a lightning rod for so many of the complaints
about our campaign finance system, whether or not they result from
145
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the Court’s decision.149 Indeed, there has been a widespread call for
a constitutional amendment to overturn the ruling, a call endorsed
by one of our two major parties, even though we have never in our
history amended the constitution to repeal First Amendment
rights.150 One thing is clear: the predicted tsunami of corporate
political spending overwhelming our democracy never materialized.
As the New York Times, one of the rulings’ harshest and most
persistent critics, was forced to admit three years after the decision:
“virtually no public corporations have spent their own money
directly in political campaigns, a practice now permitted under the
Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision.”151 Nor has corporate
spending on political campaigns increased significantly since then.152
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d. The Final Chapter
But Citizens United, as important and notorious a decision as it
is, has not been the end of the Roberts Court campaign finance story.
Though the ruling might seem a hard act to follow, the Roberts Court
decided two other very significant cases finding that campaign
finance controls were in violation of First Amendment principles.
One case was the Court’s first consideration of public financing
of campaigns since the Buckley court upheld the concept.153 In
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,154
the Court dealt with a new wrinkle whereby whenever a privately
funded candidate spent more than a publicly supported one, the latter
would be given additional money by the government to fight back.155
Though justified as simply providing “more speech,” the Roberts
Court rejected the analogy and said, on the contrary, the purpose and
effect of the scheme was to burden and deter people and independent
groups from using their own funds to speak about politics and
elections, especially since using your own funds for your campaign,
or using funds for independent speech were the least likely funding
methods to involve corruption.156 Since corruption was not being
prevented, the only rationale left for the scheme was an illicit effort
to “level the playing field” by reducing the amount of money spent
on politics, in violation of the clear Buckley principle that:
the concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of our society in order to enhance
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment, which was designed “to secure
‘the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic courses,’ and ‘“to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people.”157
153
154
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One alarming feature of the case was Justice Elena Kagan’s
opinion for the four liberal dissenters which seemed to suggest that
private financing of politics was itself inherently corrupting and that
public funding served the compelling interest of discouraging
private financing.158 Had a Democratic nominee been appointed to
the Scalia vacancy, that theme might have soon commanded
majority adherence, in my view a chilling prospect for the First
Amendment.
The other significant campaign finance decision which
expanded the scope of individual First Amendment freedom to
financially support political candidates is McCutcheon v. Federal
Election Commission.159 The case revisited an issue which Buckley
had decided, though in a quite perfunctory manner, namely, whether
it was proper for the government to set an aggregate contribution
limit on the overall amount that one person could contribute to
multiple candidates and committees.160 The overall limit was
claimed both to prevent corruption and, in effect, as a backdoor
effort to level the playing field and keep any one person from having
too much political influence through multiple contributions, even
though each one would be within proper limits.161
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, methodically
dismantled that rationale. First, he went out of his way to say that
giving financial support to a candidate or cause that you believe in
was as valid and valued a method of exercising your First
Amendment free speech rights as handing out leaflets on a street
corner or speaking on a soapbox.162 Next, he showed how the law
already had a number of filters and barriers to prevent the funds,
158
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which would be contributed to myriad different sources, from being
used for the benefit of any one candidate, and thus circumvent
individual contribution limits.163 As a result, the restriction
interfered with freedom for no valid purpose—since limits on
contributions to particular candidates were still in place—and was
struck down. The case did, however, provide for a jurisprudential
debate with dissenting Justice Stephen Breyer who insisted that
there were First Amendment values on both sides to be balanced,
including the idea that government action should reflect popular
opinion to ensure that “collective speech matters” and is not
overridden by lopsided campaign funding representing only special
interest or minority points of view.164
The final Roberts Court campaign finance case to date was the
first one to reject a First Amendment challenge to a campaign
finance restriction.165 In a five-four decision, with Chief Justice
Roberts again writing the opinion, the Court ruled that candidates
for election to judicial offices could be prohibited from directly
soliciting campaign contributions either in person or through mail
appeals.166 Rejecting the free speech arguments of groups like the
ACLU, the majority concluded that the integrity of the judiciary and,
particularly the appearance thereof, would be inherently
compromised if judicial candidates could solicit campaign funds
from lawyers appearing before them or litigants having cases in their
courts.167 Despite the obvious response from the dissenters that such
concerns could be addressed in far more focused ways,168 less
restrictive of speech and associational rights than a total ban on
solicitation, the majority felt the rule served a compelling interest in
an appropriately direct way. Perhaps the case was special because it
involved judicial elections, as the Court had suggested before,
though with the Chief Justice in dissent.169 Or perhaps a certain
battle fatigue had set in after the years of constant onslaught over
the Citizens United ruling.
163
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So, the most recent case in the Roberts Court campaign finance
canon produced a surprising outcome. But the Court’s overall
insistence that it is the people and not the government who have the
right to decide how much political speech they want or need has
been a critical chapter in the protection of First Amendment rights
and one, hopefully, that will be further enhanced with time.
3. More Space for Speech/Less Room for
Regulation
Many of the cases and themes analyzed above, and certainly the
campaign finance cases, and the cases refusing to recognize new
non-speech categories involve efforts to increase the area of
individual and group choice about speech and decrease the area of
permissible government regulation. More space for speech, so to speak.
That theme can be seen in a number of other seemingly disparate
areas and doctrines which are united by the common concern with
maximizing private speech and religious choices and minimizing
government intervention in those choices.
a. Free speech
In 1976, the Burger Court handed down the Virginia Pharmacy
Board case170 giving very strong protection to commercial speech to
serve the interests of both the speaker and the audience.171 Perhaps
stung by a criticism that the Court was using the First Amendment
to overprotect business, and risking a return to the much-criticized,
so-called Lochner era,172 the Court thereafter retreated to a
170
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balancing formula which gave frequent but less certain protection to
such commercial speech.173 As part of its efforts to deregulate
speech, the Roberts Court seemed to return to the more rigorous
scrutiny of commercial speech restrictions in a 2011 case involving
limits on the ability of pharmaceutical companies to gather and use
publicly available information in order to target doctors for
prescription drug sales.174 The Court found the law triply violative
of the First Amendment:175 it was defectively content-based in only
applying to information used for marketing, but not other purposes;
it was prohibitedly speaker-based in that it only applied to speakers
using the information for the prohibited purpose; and, as if that were
not enough, it was viewpoint-based in banning the use of the
information only to advocate the point of view that branded drugs
were better than generic drugs. Though formally applying the less
rigorous Central Hudson test,176 the Court’s evaluation of the
restriction was decidedly more hostile to censorship by government:
The State seeks to achieve its policy objectives
through the indirect means of restraining certain
speech by certain speakers – that is, by diminishing
detailer’s ability to influence prescription decisions.
Those who seek to censor or burden free expression
often assert that disfavored speech has adverse
effects. But the “fear that people would make bad
decisions if given truthful information” cannot justify
content-based burdens on speech. The State has
burdened a form of protected expression that it found
too persuasive. At the same time, the State has left
BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 125–27 (2011).
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unburdened those speakers whose messages are in
accord with its own views. This the State cannot do.177
The result? More free speech and less regulated speech.
Putting barriers around government efforts to control speech was
also evident in Agency for International Development v. Open
Society International,178 a case involving the federal government’s
efforts to compel speech of groups receiving federal funds for
international AIDS-prevention work.179 The groups could not use
public funds to advocate prostitution—a limitation on the use of the
money that all concede was a valid condition on and limitation of
the scope of the funded program—but the statute also compelled the
group, in order to obtain the funding, to adopt a policy specifically
opposing prostitution.180 The Court ruled that the compelled
affirmation exceeded the scope of the program, violated the First
Amendment, and could not be sustained.181 The government could
tell the group what to say or do with the government’s funds, but
could not with their own private funds, and could not compel them
to pledge allegiance to the government’s ideological message.182
The Court’s reasoning was very instructive and reflective of the
pervasive theme of more space for speech:
It is, however, a basic First Amendment principle
that “freedom of speech prohibits the government
from telling people what they must say.” At the heart
of the First Amendment lies the principle that each
person should decide for himself or herself the ideas
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and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration,
and adherence.”183
[T]he Policy . . . requires [the group] to pledge
allegiance to the Government’s policy of eradicating
prostitution. As to that, we cannot improve upon
what Justice Jackson wrote for the Court 70 years
ago: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.”184
Agency for International Development was an important victory to
limit the First Amendment strings that can be attached to the grant
of federal funds or subsidies, a victory that liberals had long sought
and conservatives might disapprove but neutrally applying
principles beneficial to speakers across the political spectrum.
Another area where the Roberts Court applied strong First
Amendment protections to guard against government-compelled
speech involved whether non-members of public employee unions
who benefit from collective bargaining of salaries, benefits, and
working conditions can be compelled to financially support those
union’s activities, even though the non-members disagree and
disapprove.185 Going back to the 1977 case, Abood v. Detroit Board
of Education, the accommodation had been that the dissenters could
be made to subsidize the job-related work of the unions, but not the
political advocacy.186 But the Roberts Court had gradually removed
many of the requirements of unwilling support, thereby enlarging
the sphere of First Amendment freedom from being compelled to
subsidize speech with which one disagrees. In one case, the Court
held that a state could require public sector unions to get the
affirmative consent of non-members before using their fees for
183

Id. at 2327 (citations omitted) (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. &
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election-related purposes.187 Then a year later, the Court held that the
First Amendment requires an opt-in rule whereby the non-members’
affirmative consent must be obtained to spend their money on
political purposes.188 Two years after that, the Court refused to
extend Abood to cover home health care workers, invoking “the
bedrock principle that, except perhaps in the rarest of circumstances,
no person in this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by
a third party that he or she does not wish to support.”189
The final logical step—holding that the First Amendment bars
using non-members fees even for collective bargaining activities—
would probably have been taken this year if Justice Scalia had not
died. In Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association,190 non-union
members claimed that they were philosophically opposed to
collective bargaining by public sector unions because of the
endemic political conflicts of interest inherent in the situation and
that the First Amendment prevented them from having to support
such activity. Based on the oral argument in January 2016, the Court
seemed poised to agree with them and overturn Abood which
permitted such use of non-members fees.191 But, with Justice Scalia
gone, the Court split, and the lower court ruling against the First
Amendment claimants was affirmed by an equally divided Court.192
That effectively suspended the Roberts Court’s First Amendment
efforts in this area to enlarge the area of individual employees’
control over being compelled to speak or not speak, reduce the
government’s sovereignty, and thus give more breathing space for
speech and less room for regulation.

187

Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 191 (2007).
Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295–96 (2012).
189
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014).
190
Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, No. SACV 13-676-JLS (CWx), 2013
WL 9825479, at *1–2 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 5, 2013), aff’d, No. 13-57095, 2014 WL
10076847 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
191
See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Seems Poised to Deal Unions a Major
Setback, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/12/us/politics/atsupreme-court-public-unions-face-possible-major-setback.html?_r=0.
192
See Adam Liptak, Victory for Unions as Supreme Court, Scalia Gone,
Ties 4-4, N.Y.TIMES (Mar. 29, 2016),http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/us/politics/friedrichsv-california-teachers-association-union-fees-supreme-court-ruling.html.
188

FREE SPEECH MATTERS

105

b. Religious Freedom
Perhaps not surprisingly, the Roberts Court manifested a similar
pattern in First Amendment freedom of religion cases; in both
honoring Free Exercise Clause claims that government should
accommodate religious conscience, and rejecting Establishment
Clause objections that the government should not be supporting
religious activity, the Court expanded the range of personal choice
over religious expression and reduced the area of government
mandate.
The Roberts Court has been generous in protecting religious
conscience in Free Exercise cases, as it has protected personal
expression in its free speech cases, whether applying the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise clause or the statutory protections of
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act. For example, in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission,193 the Court recognized a “ministerial exception”
grounded in the religion clauses of the First Amendment and
unanimously ruled that it would violate both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause for the government to apply
federal antidiscrimination laws to intrude on a church’s decision to
fire a minister.194 The effect is more freedom for religious choices
from government interference. The Court has also applied statutory
protections to allow a prison inmate to wear a beard required for
religious observance despite claimed security concerns195 and a
clothing store employee to wear a religious headscarf.196 Finally, in
the well-known “Hobby Lobby” case, the Roberts Court upheld the
statutory rights of a closely held corporation, run strictly along
religious doctrinal lines, to resist providing contraceptive coverage
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Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Equal Emp’t
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Id. at 188.
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for its employees under Obamacare because of its owners’ religious
scruples.197
Interestingly, in two sharply divided Establishment Clause
cases, in rejecting or deflecting the objections to religious actions by
government, the Roberts Court majority emphasized that a contrary
result would have invited intrusive government censorship and
judicial review of speech occurring under government auspices.198
For example, a claimed violation of the Establishment Clause
caused by the White House having an Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives was turned aside partly on the ground that
there should not be censorship of religious themes in Presidential
speeches or actions.199 Likewise, one of the reasons cited for
allowing prayers to start meetings of local government bodies,
despite Establishment Clause objections, was to avoid censorship of
the precise language that would be used at such meetings.200
Despite the fact that the Roberts Court has given religious
speech, beliefs, and conduct wide latitude and immunity from
governmental controls, there are storm clouds on that particular First
Amendment horizon as well. The Court’s decision in Christian
Legal Society v. Martinez,201 denying a Christian student law school
group official status because it required its members to commit to
pre-marital abstinence, was claimed, by the dissenters, to have
improperly discriminated against students because of their
fundamental Christian beliefs.202 Likewise, in Obergefell v. Hodges,
the Court’s recent landmark same sex marriage case, the majority
noted that some would have religious objections to recognizing such
marriages, but then said that such objectors were free to voice their
contrary opinions, without also suggesting that they might have any
constitutional immunity from having to participate in celebration of
same sex marriages, an additional concern noted by the
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See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 611–12 (2007);
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1822 (2014).
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dissenters.203 Indeed, in a recent “Hobby Lobby”-type case, where a
religious order claimed religious objection to providing health care
contraceptive services, the Court was unable to reach a decision on
the merits and remanded the case urging the parties to negotiate a
compromise if possible.204 Clearly, Justice Scalia’s replacement will
play a pivotal role in the disposition of these cases which pit
religious conscience against anti-discrimination laws.
This all raises the question of whether there is no longer a
majority for strong protection of conscientious objection by
fundamentalist Christians from civic obligations. Ironically, in an
earlier era, when the conscientious objection came from Quakers,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists and others, or
resulted from opposition to the War in Vietnam, it met a more
favorable response in the liberal Warren Court.205 The strongest
decision in that era protecting conscientious objectors against
complying with otherwise valid and neutral civic requirements—a
case involving a Seventh Day Adventist who was denied
203

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08, 2625 (2015) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court has turned aside appeals from those claiming
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unemployment benefits because her religion prevented her from
working on the Sabbath—was written by liberal Justice William
Brennen in Sherbert v. Verner.206 Now, liberal groups who
championed religious freedom in the past suggest it must be
balanced against competing interests like gay rights, and the Court
seems inclined to agree. The result, it seems, may be less, not more,
protection for religious free exercise.
4. Content Neutrality
Another speech-protective theme strongly sounded by the
Roberts Court is the presumptive invalidity of content-based
regulations of speech. Fueled by anticensorship instincts, the content
neutrality doctrine seeks to prevent the government from exercising
control or favoring speech based on its content, unless the content
brings it within one of the very few “non-speech” categories, or,
failing that, if the government can satisfy the demands of strict
scrutiny for the content-based rule.
The rule against content discrimination has long been a staple of
First Amendment jurisprudence. A generation ago, in a case where
Chicago forbid picketing near a school except when related to labor
disputes, the Court unanimously ruled, in an opinion by Justice
Thurgood Marshall, that such a content-based distinction was
anathema to the First Amendment:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content. To permit the continued building of
our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment
for each individual, our people are guaranteed the
right to express any thought, free from government
censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship
is content control. Any restriction on expressive
activity because of its content would completely
undercut the “profound national commitment to the
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principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”207
A generation later, the Roberts Court would employ this
principle in numerous different free speech settings to minimize
government censorship and maximize individual choice.208 Most
recently it did so to invalidate a local Arizona town ordinance that
restricted the public display of various signs, but contained
numerous content-based exemptions and exceptions which
discriminated against a small church group whose temporary
meeting signs did not qualify for one of the exceptions.209 The
Court, in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, ruled that the
ordinance, which on its face made the differential treatment turn on
the signs’ content, was a clear violation of the rule against contentbased controls of speech unless they can be justified under strict
scrutiny, which this one could not.210 The important speechprotective aspect of the ruling was the Court’s insistence that, even
if the government did not have a censorial or malicious motive for
the restriction, so long as it was content-based on its face, it would
be treated as such:
A law that is content based on its face is subject to
strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign
motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of
“animus toward the ideas contained” in the regulated
207
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394 U.S. 576 (1969); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964)
and cases cited; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963); Wood v. Georgia,
370 U.S. 375, 388–89 (1962); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)).
208
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (holding that a
federal statute which criminalized the commercial creation, sale, or possession of
depictions of animal cruelty was a content-based regulation of expression and thus
implicated the First Amendment); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558
U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that a federal statute which barred independent corporate
expenditures for electioneering communications violated First Amendment
principles of free speech); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011)
(holding that video games qualify for First Amendment protection as contentbased expression).
209
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2232 (2015).
210
Id. at 2231–32.

110

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

speech. We have thus made clear that “‘[i]llicit
legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation
of the First Amendment,’” and a party opposing the
government “need adduce ‘no evidence of an
improper censorial motive.’” Although “a contentbased purpose may be sufficient in certain
circumstances to show that a regulation is content
based, it is not necessary.” In other words, an
innocuous justification cannot transform a facially
content-based law into one that is content neutral.211
The First Amendment requires no less. Innocent
motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship
presented by a facially content-based statute, as
future government officials may one day wield such
statutes to suppress disfavored speech. That is why
the First Amendment expressly targets the operation
of the laws—i.e., the “abridg[ement] of speech”—
rather than merely the motives of those who enacted
them. “The vice of content-based legislation . . . is
not that it is always used for invidious, thoughtcontrol purposes, but that it lends itself to use for
those purposes.”212
In another case, though the Court divided sharply over whether
restrictions on sidewalk counseling near abortion clinics should be
judged as content-based, the Court unanimously struck the law
down as not being narrowly tailored to serve a significant
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governmental interest.213 The abortion protestors fared better than
anti-war dissenters of an earlier generation convicted for burning
their draft cards, under a law which on its face was content-neutral,
and which the Court concluded was unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, even though it was widely known that Congress
adopted the law to suppress anti-war protests.214 In that case, not a
single Justice on the liberal Warren Court found a First Amendment
violation.215 The Roberts Court did somewhat better than that.
Content-based rules are not automatically invalid; on unusual
occasions, they have been sustained even though the Court
purported to apply strict scrutiny.216 The Roberts Court has twice
upheld such laws, even though it applied strict scrutiny.217 But for the
most part, in the Roberts Court, strict scrutiny was usually fatal scrutiny.
5. Speaker Equality
One other critical hallmark of the Roberts Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence is that the protections should be equally
available to all speakers; no privileged speakers, pariah speakers,
second class speakers, and no First Amendment caste system. This
theme has been especially evident in the campaign finance cases,
most notably in Citizens United where the Court swept aside and
dismantled the previous distinctions in the law as to which groups
could use their funds to speak on electoral politics and which could
not. It replaced a patchwork system where the ability to speak was
contingent on several variables having to do with the speech—the
speaker, the medium, and the timing—with a universal rule: free
speech for all individuals and groups where campaign finance
213
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restrictions were involved.218 The Court envisioned a rule with no
content- or speaker-based restrictions, at least certainly without the
most persuasive justifications:
the Government may commit a constitutional wrong
when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers.
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it
to others, the Government deprives the
disadvantaged person or class of the right to use
speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and
respect for the speaker’s voice. The Government may
not by these means deprive the public of the right and
privilege to determine for itself what speech and
speakers are worthy of consideration. The First
Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the
ideas that flow from each.219
Chief Justice Roberts went out of his way to sound the same
theme—that all speakers are equal under the First Amendment and
entitled to equal respect for their different ways of speaking—in
McCutcheon, striking down aggregate limits on contributions to
federal candidates and committees.220 As he stated:
There is no right more basic in our democracy than
the right to participate in electing our political
leaders. Citizens can exercise that right in a variety
of ways: They can run for office themselves, vote,
urge others to vote for a particular candidate,
volunteer to work on a campaign, and contribute to a
candidate’s campaign. This case is about the last of
those options . . . . Money in politics may at times
seem repugnant to some, but so too does much of
what the First Amendment vigorously protects. If the
First Amendment protects flag burning, funeral
218
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protests, and Nazi parades—despite the profound
offense such spectacles cause—it surely protects
political campaign speech despite popular
opposition.221
He also sounded a similar theme that the individual, not the
government, gets to decide the medium for his or her political
speech and association:
Those First Amendment rights are important
regardless whether the individual is, on the one hand,
a “lone pamphleteer[] or street corner orator[] in the
Tom Paine mold,” or is, on the other, someone who
spends “substantial amounts of money in order to
communicate [his] political ideas through
sophisticated” means. Either way, he is participating
in an electoral debate that we have recognized is
“integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution.”222
The Roberts Court showed a similar solicitude for the modernday version of the lone pamphleteer in McCullen v. Coakley, a case
concerning pro-life protestors. Chief Justice Robert’s opinion
extolled the speakers’ methodology in the most respectful terms,
contrasting the “sidewalk counselors” to more strident anti-abortion
protestors:
McCullen and the other petitioners consider it
essential to maintain a caring demeanor, a calm tone
of voice, and direct eye contact during these
exchanges. Such interactions, petitioners believe, are
a much more effective means of dissuading women
from having abortions than confrontational methods
such as shouting or brandishing signs, which in
petitioners’ view tend only to antagonize their
intended audience. In unrefuted testimony,
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petitioners say they have collectively persuaded
hundreds of women to forgo abortions.223
With this sensitive and laudatory description of the kind of
speech in which the challengers engage, there is little wonder the
Court concluded that the government creation of zones around
abortion clinics in which such conversations cannot be had
“compromise[d] petitioner’s ability to initiate the close, personal
conversations that they view as essential to “sidewalk counseling,”
and did so without proper justification.224
So, to the Roberts Court, the lonely pamphleteer, the soap-box
orator, the itinerant church group, the Citizens United supporter, the
well-heeled campaign contributor and the sidewalk counselor have
equal status and are entitled to equal respect under the First
Amendment. All are accorded the maximum First Amendment
protection and respect because protecting their speech serves the
multiple purposes of the First Amendment: maximizing the right of
the individual and group to speak; minimizing the government’s
ability to censor and control that speech; and guaranteeing the public
as much information as possible for self-governance and selffulfillment.
6. On Balance, No Balancing
One final hallmark of the Roberts Court First Amendment work
is the resistance to engage in a balancing of free speech rights
against governmental interests in an ad hoc, case by case fashion.225
223
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This theme appeared most strongly in the cases where the Court
refused to engage in a balancing process that would result in creating
new non-speech categories on the basis that some speech was so
worthless that it could be banned in a plenary fashion.226 The wellknown case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire227 had suggested that
this was precisely why some forms of speech “are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”228 But
when pressed to make that evaluation in the context of animal
cruelty depictions, or violent video games, or lying about military
honors, the majority reacted sharply against such ad hoc balancing
as being “startling and dangerous.”229 The same preference for
relative certainty of rules was evident in the insistence that any
content-based laws should be treated as presumptively invalid,
regardless of censorial intent or perhaps even some common sense
content-based justification in certain circumstances. Indeed, as one
scholar has observed in a related context:
Judged in any number of ways, Citizens United
appears to be the most countermajoritarian act of the
Court in many decades. Indeed, Citizens United is
perhaps the most visible such act on an issue of high
public salience since the Court’s brief encounter with
the symbolic issue of flag-burning in the late 1980s,
or the Court’s more substantive engagement with the
death-penalty in its decisions of the 1970s.230
226
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The assertion, in effect, that the Roberts Court has been too rigid
and categorical in its protection of free speech has been part of the
appeal to take a more evenly balanced approach to free speech
issues. A leading voice on the Court for this approach has been
Justice Stephen Breyer, the author of Active Liberty, a book
defending the concept that the Court’s job is to balance competing
government and speaker interests and weigh all of the variables on
a case-by-case basis, rather than through broader categorical
doctrinal imperatives.231 In some instances, the balance will require
a careful, sometimes unpredictable, weighing and measuring of the
government’s interests against the speakers.232 In others, it will
require recognizing that there are often other constitutional and
social values of equal importance poised on the scales against free
speech. That was his theory in McCutcheon where his dissent
maintained that excessive campaign spending could mean that the
true opinions of a majority of the community were not being enacted
and were being thwarted because of the influence of money on the
political process: “the First Amendment advances not only the
individual’s right to engage in political speech, but also the public’s
interest in preserving a democratic order in which collective speech
matters.”233 The political process corruption that results, Breyer
argues, undermines the First Amendment by thwarting the majority
will.234 But, as Chief Justice Roberts responded, the “collective
speech” referred to is basically the will of the majority, and the
whole point of the First Amendment is to restrain and protect against
majority laws which stifle individual and minority speech.235
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(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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Chief Justice Roberts responded as follows:
But there are compelling reasons not to define the boundaries
of the First Amendment by reference to such a generalized
conception of the public good. First, the dissent’s ‘collective
speech’ reflected in laws is of course the will of the majority,
and plainly can include laws that restrict free speech. The whole
point of the First Amendment is to afford individuals protection
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Moreover, the “collective” interest of the majority is always taken
account of when the Court seeks to determine if the law serves any
compelling interest sufficient to override free speech.236 As has
always been the case, however, the more one relies on balancing,
the more one relies on the balancer and his or her five factors —to
resolve the case. And while the “absolutism” associated with Justice
Hugo L. Black or many of the Roberts Court’s decisions cannot give
certainty of outcome, it can provide relatively more so, in my view,
than the ad hoc balancing that Justice Breyer has championed.
II. NOT SO FIRST AMENDMENT FRIENDLY
Of course, the Roberts Court has decided some significant cases
which did not protect the asserted First Amendment rights. To many,
these are the true face of the Roberts Court, with most of the prospeech cases described above written off either as cases motivated
by the desire to protect wealth and business, or easy cases whose
results were predetermined. I have suggested elsewhere that the first
category of those cases were first and foremost First Amendment
cases with constant themes that transcended the particular interests

against such infringements. The First Amendment does not
protect the government, even when the government purports to
act through legislation reflecting “collective speech.”
Id. at 1449.
236
For a further discussion of these issues, see Ronald K.L. Collins, Three
Harvard Law Review Essays Discuss Justice Breyer’s Free Speech
Jurisprudence, CONCURRING OPINIONS: FAN 41 (FIRST AMENDMENT NEWS)
(Nov. 11, 2014), http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/11/fan-41-firstamendment-news-three-harvard-law-review-essays-discuss-justice-breyers-freespeech-jurisprudence.html; Ronald K.L. Collins, Madison Unplugged: A Candid
Q&A With Burt Neuborne About Law, Life and His Latest Book, CONCURRING
OPINIONS: FAC 5 (FIRST AMENDMENT CONVERSATIONS) (May 27, 2015),
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2015/05/fac-5-first-amendmentconversations-madison-unplugged-a-candid-qa-with-burt-neuborne-about-lawlife-his-latest-book.html.
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at stake.237 As to whether some of the cases were easy, many were
sharply divided cases, hardly the hallmark of an easy outcome.238
Nonetheless, in several significant cases the Court did, indeed,
reject First Amendment claims and sustain restrictions on free
speech. In one much-criticized decision, Garcetti v. Ceballos, the
Court, five to four, held that government employees—in that case a
whistle-blower in a district attorney’s office who wrote a memo
detailing alleged perjury by a prosecution witness—had no First
Amendment protection if the speech at issue was communicated
“pursuant to their official duties.”239 That categorical exclusion of a
large amount of public employee speech from constitutional
protection is troubling, to be sure. But Garcetti relied on a case from
an earlier era, Connick v. Myers, where an assistant district attorney
was likewise denied protection for speech dealing with internal
workplace grievances and having no significant public interest, a
decision where the Court expressed a concern with becoming, in
effect, the nation’s civil service appeals board.240 Both cases
reflected the same theme of not wanting to second-guess the actions
of government supervisors in controlling the workplace-related
speech of their tens of millions of employees.241 Indeed, in a very
recent case, the Court granted First Amendment protection to an
employee who had revealed official wrongdoing in the course of
testifying in court pursuant to a subpoena, a context which the Court
characterized as clearly a matter of public concern, thus blunting the
force of Garcetti somewhat.242 These problems of applying the First
Amendment in the context of public officials’ behavior may have
also motived a five-four Court in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar
to uphold a ban on candidates running for election to judicial office
237
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personally soliciting campaign contributions.243 Over the arguments
of the ACLU, and despite subjecting the ban to strict scrutiny
because it was a content-based restraint on speech, Chief Justice
Roberts reasoned that the restriction was necessary to protect the
integrity of the judiciary and the appearance thereof.244 That was
surprising and disappointing in light of the uneven way in which the
restriction applied and the fact that the Chief Justice had dissented
from an earlier case which involved limitations on campaign
funding in judicial elections.245
Students have not fared well in the Roberts Court either, and in
two significant cases, Morse v. Frederick,246 and Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez,247 the Court rejected their First Amendment
claims challenging the actions of school officials. In Morse, often
cited as proof of the Court’s lack of fealty to free speech, a five-four
Court, divided along liberal and conservative lines, upheld
punishment of a high school student for holding up a pro-drugs sign
at a school-sanctioned event.248 Further, the few Supreme Court
cases since the landmark decision which first recognized free speech
rights for school students, the famous Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,249 have usually ruled
against the student.250 Morse, though highly questionable, was
243
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consistent with that pattern. It is also disappointing that the Court
has been unwilling to grant review in any recent cases where school
officials punished students for “offensive” speech or for speech on
the internet, away from the physical venue of the schools.251
Conservative Christian students also suffered a significant First
Amendment defeat when a five-four Court upheld a public law
school’s refusal to give full campus recognition to a student group
because it required a pledge of pre-marital celibacy—same sex or
opposite sex—in order to become members.252 Finding that this was
a proper, non-censorial denial of use of a limited public forum to a
group which improperly excluded some students who did not share
its value system, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg rejected the students’
First Amendment claims.253 The Court reached this outcome despite
the fact that in an earlier case, involving exclusion of a left-wing
group from campus recognition during the heyday of the Vietnam
War protests, the Court had found a violation of First Amendment
rights of speech and association.254 This disparity caused the
dissenters to complain bitterly that the law school had engaged in
prohibited viewpoint discrimination against the Christian group.255
The public forum doctrine also played a role in a recent case
where, again five-four, the Court rejected the First Amendment
251
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Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 51–52 (2006). A unanimous Court rejected the claim that the
federal requirement, imposed as a condition of receiving education funding, that
schools not deny recruiting services to military employers—which many schools
had done to protest the military’s former anti-gay rights discriminatory policy of
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claims of the Sons of the Confederacy who were denied the right to
use their name and logo on license plates issued by Texas.256 The
reason for the refusal was that some people felt the group
represented a message of an offensive history or philosophy of racial
discrimination—a reason which normally would be a totally
impermissible basis for government action. But the majority ruled,
again over the protests of the ACLU, that the license plates were not
at all a forum for private speech, even though the State permitted
that, but rather an example of government speech over which the
State had complete editorial control.257
Two final cases demonstrate additional, unfortunate departures
from the Roberts Court’s normally strong protection of First
Amendment rights. First, is the decision in Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project,258 where a six-three majority decided that the First
Amendment did not afford a right to give “material support” even to
the peaceful, lawful activities of a certified terrorist organization.259
Though applying strict scrutiny, the Court nonetheless ruled that
Congress could properly determine whether funding or other
support could be improperly fungible and therefore effectively
available to support the violent activities of the terrorist group.260 It
is ironic that the decision came the same term as Citizens United,
resulting in a two-case combination where every Justice ruled
against the First Amendment: the liberals gave Congress the benefit
of the doubt in allowing regulation of campaign speech and the
conservatives did the same thing in the regulation of terrorism case.
Only Justice Stevens was consistent, rejecting First Amendment
protection in both cases. As I have said elsewhere, I think this is one
situation where the Warren Court, or at least some of the most profree speech Justices on that Court, would have ruled for the First
Amendment and against the government in both cases.261
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The final case where the First Amendment claim was not denied,
but was diverted, posed an old problem which has plagued the Court
for almost forty years: the regulation of “indecency” on broadcast
media.262 In 1978, the Court divided sharply on whether the FCC
could penalize a radio station for broadcasting the late comedian
George Carlin’s brilliant, satirical monologue, the “Seven Dirty
Words You Can’t Say on the Radio.”263 The Court narrowly upheld
the restriction, but the liberals of that day vehemently dissented. In
contemporary times, the issue came back to the Court in the
celebrity of Bono, Cher, and others who used “fleeting expletives”
on television broadcasts, in violation of the FCC rules on
“indecency” on the airwaves.264 This time the broadcasters won, but
only on the Due Process/First Amendment vagueness grounds that
the FCC rules did not provide adequate guidance as to which speech
would come within the guidelines; not, unfortunately, on the broader
ground that government could not ban indecency from the airwaves
as a substantive free speech matter.265
From a strong free speech perspective, these various Roberts
Court decisions are troubling in their rejection of First Amendment
claims. But there does not seem to be an identifiable pattern to them,
beyond the determination in each particularly idiosyncratic case that
the government justifications were persuasive. No broad First
Amendment theory of balancing or deference seems to predominate
in these cases. As a result, despite these cases, the Roberts Court’s
First Amendment legacy remains a surprisingly strong one.
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CONCLUSION: WHAT IS THE FUTURE FOR FREE SPEECH?
So, what can one conclude about the Roberts Court and the First
Amendment after the various ebbs and flows in its First Amendment
jurisprudence? To be sure, the cases just discussed were significant
rejections of First Amendment claims. But many of them involved
government controlled enclaves, auspices, or premises where the
First Amendment has not traditionally had the same penetrating
power. And the Roberts Court certainly did not seem to expand
government control in those circumstances, with the possible
exception of disclosure.
More broadly, it is the rare Roberts Court First Amendment
decision which has cut back on established rights and expanded
government authority over what had previously been accorded.
Indeed, a major consequence of the Roberts Court’s First
Amendment rulings has been to expand the scope of individual
choice about speech and reduce the area of government control and
censorship. The Court has done so by emphasizing the libertarian
themes of individual choice, the anticensorship themes of distrusting
government to make First Amendment choices, and the
disinclination to subject free speech protections to an ad hoc
balancing process weighing government and speakers’ interests, a
process that leaves those rights uncertain and at greater risk. In the
words of one scholar and Supreme Court advocate, the libertarian
nature of the Citizens United decision reflects the Roberts Court’s
“emerging coherent vision of free speech that may characterize
future Roberts Court decisions. In this vision, the more speech the
better, with its distribution and assessment nearly always best left to
the citizenry rather than the government.”266
What does the future hold for free speech? As indicated at the
outset, the strongly speech-protective Roberts Court lost one of its
key voices with the untimely death of Justice Scalia in February,
2016. As a result, the ten-year legacy described above was thrown
into jeopardy, especially with the expectation that the successor
Justice would be more congenial to what, ironically, has become the
“liberal” view of free speech—more willingness to balance
government interests against free speech and less willing to engage
266
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in First Amendment “absolutism.” Certainly, there is very
prominent academic support for this swing of the pendulum.267 But
in my view, replacing the insistence of First Amendment
“absolutism” with the “it depends” of ad hoc balancing will in the
long run augur ill for free speech and the values it serves.
Unfortunately, so it seemed, a future Court might very well not give
the First Amendment the same strong protection it received at the
hands of the Roberts Court. But the results of the 2016 federal
elections have significantly eased such concerns.
Even if, for some reason, the Roberts Court’s strong free speech
stance were to prevail for the near future, that will not guarantee that
free speech will be the rule and not the exception in everyday life.
Indeed, for the decade that the Court was giving that stronger
protection, in everyday life, free speech seemed to be under fire and
in jeopardy. As I noted in a 2013 article:
There is a deep and distressing divide between our
free speech rights on paper and in the real world.
Speech that, according to the courts, is protected
from punishment or suppression under the First
Amendment is nonetheless subject to a barrage of
public or private sanctions and deprivations that
create the proverbial chilling effect. This causes
speakers to “steer far wider of the unlawful zone.”
The gap is most yawning with respect to speech
labeled racist, sexist, or homophobic, followed in
close second by speech viewed as hostile to the
Islamic religion. These restraints are enforced by
public agencies and officials—and by private
entities—in the context of education, employment,
business and commerce, as well as within the
political sphere. The jurisprudential mantra is that
the proper antidote to bad or offensive or ugly speech
is “more speech.” In real life, however, the antidote
to speech that offends or disturbs others is to visit
punishments and restraints, formal and informal, on
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those whose speech confounds the conventional
wisdom or mainstream mandates.268
Nor has the situation improved since then. As Professor Nadine
Strossen’s article so powerfully demonstrates, in the academic
setting the situation seems ever more repressive.269 Just one example
she cites makes the point, namely, the travails of a Northwestern
University Professor, a feminist, who criticized some of the sexual
harassment rules being enforced under Title IX and who was then
the target of a charge that her criticism of those rules themselves
constituted a violation of Title IX.270 This may be the tip of the
iceberg, and chilling effect in the academic community can be real.271
Free speech in the private workplace can also be subject to
wholesale deterrence. In a recent New York Times article about
ways to reduce racial discrimination by police officers, the author
pointed out that in one case police allegedly used a racial epithet in
268
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arresting a suspect, and yet none of the arresting officers was
punished, a situation which would not be tolerated in the private
sector: “It is hard, if not impossible at this particular moment, to
imagine a single private-sector context in which an employee’s
offensive racial or ethnic remarks would meet with no meaningful
consequence.”272 The author argued the same zero tolerance should
be applied to statements by police officials as well.273 To my mind,
the ease with which we seem willing to silence and punish even one
offensive remark by an employee is the problem, not the solution,
and generates a powerful chilling effect on speech, without the
careful justifications normally required of such censorship. Finally,
recent allegations of censorship by enormously powerful social
media organizations like Facebook and Twitter raise concerns about
suppression of free speech coming from such communication
gatekeepers.274
The instinct to try to punish or silence those whose views we
find offensive or wrong can be a powerful weapon in the hands of
government officials who have wide discretionary power over so
many decisions. For example, here was the free speech lesson given
by the mayors of two of our most cosmopolitan cities, Boston and
Chicago: they each appeared to threaten to deny new business
franchise licenses to the Chick-fil-a company because of the views
of the head of the company in favor of traditional marriage.275
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Furthermore, the mayor of our largest city threatened to terminate,
or at least review, contracts the city had with Donald Trump after he
expressed some of his anti-immigrant views.276
All of this derogation of free speech in everyday life highlights
the wisdom of the famous Judge Learned Hand, (who happened to
have written one of the first protective free speech decisions)
imparted in a speech administering the oath of citizenship to a group
of newly naturalized Americans:
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it
dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save
it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much
to help it. While it lies there, it needs no constitution,
no law, no court to save it.277
And in trying to internalize the liberty of free speech, perhaps
we should be guided by the following aspirations:
Americans have fought and died around the globe to
protect the right of all people to express their views,
even views that we profoundly disagree with. We do
so not because we support hateful speech, but
because our founders understood that without such
protections, the capacity of each individual to
express their views and practice their own faith may
be threatened. We do so because in a diverse society,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/chick-fil-blocked-opening-chicagostore/story?id=16853890.
276
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efforts to restrict speech can quickly become a tool
to silence critics and oppress minorities.
We do so because given the power of faith in our
lives, and the passion that religious differences can
inflame, the strongest weapon against hateful speech
is not repression; it is more speech – the voices of
tolerance that rally against bigotry and blasphemy,
and lift up the values of understanding and mutual
respect.278
President Obama’s stirring remarks well capture the theme of
this article. The Roberts Court has been a strong defender of First
Amendment rights and values of the kind identified by President
Obama. The Court’s effort to expand the scope of individual and
group choice over how to exercise First Amendment rights and
concomitantly reduce the power of government to preempt those
choices has been in keeping with the most speech protective themes
of earlier eras on the Court, and, in some instances, has surpassed
those protections. While this approach has played out in various
areas and through different doctrinal mechanisms, it often seems to
have been inspired by the same first principles of free speech that
President Obama identified. The future will tell us whether the
doctrinal and jurisprudential legacy of the Roberts Court will prevail
and whether it will become a more enduring part of our national
fabric.
What does the Roberts Court’s First Amendment legacy augur
for the future? Its jurisprudential baseline was the constitutional
imperative of special protection for First Amendment rights
implemented by a general and strong presumption against
restrictions or burdens on those rights. If the doctrinal paths
following those principles were to continue unabated, the
consequences would be significant. More decisions deregulating
aspects of campaign finance controls could be expected. Greater
protection of sexual content speech might be in the works.
Governmental censorship and discrimination based on the content
of the regulated speech might be more difficult to accomplish and
278
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implement. And a serious requirement that government regulations
of speech be narrowly tailored to closely fit their objectives might
be imposed across the board. Finally, greater protection for religious
freedom and of religious speech in the public square might ensue.
The consequences of the 2016 elections, however, make it far
less likely that Justice Scalia’s replacement and other possible Court
membership changes in the next few years will lead to a
retrenchment and retreat on the protection of First Amendment
rights. As a result, happily from my perspective, we are much less
likely to see a Court that would approve greater regulation of the use
of money in politics, more leeway for government to regulate
business and commercial speech, and more willingness to allow
government to regulate on the basis of the psychological harms that
speech may cause. Nor will there likely be a movement away from
a categorical approach favoring firm speech protection toward a
balancing of the benefits of speech against the burdens or risks that
speech may impose. Finally, and quite ironically, a stronger First
Amendment-protective Court would also serve as a constitutional
barricade against the kind of watering down of First Amendment
rights that President Trump has seemed to support, at least with
respect to such hot button issues as flag burning as protest and press
protection against defamation lawsuits.
I am hopeful that the Court will continue to reject that watering
down of First Amendment rights and continue to remember the
wisdom of Justice Brandeis that the strongest protections of free
speech are imperative for the well-being of both the individual and
the society.

